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When we lose control over our minds through hatred, selfishness, jealousy, and anger, 
we lose our sense of judgment. Our minds are blinded, and at those wild moments, anything 
can happen, including war. Thus the practice of compassion and wisdom is useful to all, 
especially to those responsible for running national affairs, in whose hands lie the power and 
opportunity to create the structure of world peace (Dalai Lama, 2011: 250, emphases added) 
 
The theme of this chapter is the institutionalization of unreason, taking the form of 
practices that engender and endorse “hatred, selfishness”, etc., and the role of meditation, 
including meditative Mindfulness,  in disarming and deinstitutionalizing unreason. Meditative 
awareness can enable critical reflection and transformation, as contrasted with unreasoned 
reactivity, on practices that diminish our “sense of judgment”. The needless suffering associated 
with “hatred”, “jealousy”, “anger” and other ego-building and defensive emotions is manifest in 
contemporary expressions of sectarianism and fanaticism in corporations as well as in society.  
 
I explore the de/institutionalization of unreason by considering the connection between 
what Mills (1959) terms “private troubles” and “public issues”; and what Hanisch (1970), 
relatedly but not synonymously identifies as “the personal” and “the political”. We may think, 
for example, of how ostensibly “private” or “personal” feelings of resentment, such as those 
resulting from  the divisive impacts of neoliberalism and neocolonialism, are reflected and 
reinforced in the “public issue” of populism and its wider “political” reverberations. 
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In the absence of critical reflection, fear is assuaged and contained by identifying with 
something (e.g. a sect, the nation) that is assumed to provide security. Forms of populism involve 
“symbolic participation” by people who readily identify with, and defer to, the slogans of  
religious, corporate and/or national leaders promising solutions to their problems - often by 
veiling or trivializing the problem while presenting themselves as possessing the strength to 
implement the solution (Freire, 2005: 78). Increased opportunities for self-actualization or an 
expansion of self-determination are promised but, as Freire (2005) argues, freedom can only be 
lived, it cannot be bestowed; and this requires “risking life” in a demanding, liberating process of 
continously becoming. Freedom is a product of praxis; it is not something that can be gifted by 
others.  
 
To explore the institutionalization of unreason and the mystification of freedom, I 
interrogate two texts. The first is Mills’ The Sociological Imagination (1959) which considers the 
dis/connect between “private troubles” and “public issues”. Addressing the context of post-War 
America, Mills argues that many US citizens had been turned, largely by big business, into 
superficially contented conformists, or “Cheerful Robots” (Mills, 1959: 189 et seq). As 
producers and as consumers, the “robots” are seen to have fallen prey to the unreason and 
unfreedom of an affluent society. Racked by a sense of  “uneasiness”  and “indifference” (Mills, 
1959: 18), they lack the capacity to connect their “personal troubles” to the “public issue” of a 
“structure”, to invoke the Dalai Lama’s term (see indented quote above). In the context of the US 
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in the 1950s that, arguably, continues today, this “structure” is the medium but also an outcome 
of dehumanized, alienating processes of production and consumption.  
 
A contemporary manifestation of the malaise of alienation and self-absorption identified 
by Mills is, perhaps, the robotic slave of Mindfulness who, by engaging in continuous self-
surveillance of his or her inner state, has little awareness of its connection to “public issues” – 
that is, to “the regime and circumstances that are making people anxious, miserable and sick” 
(Purser and Forbes, 2017). For Mills, the key to addressing and correcting the malaise is the 
development and dissemination of a sociological imagination capable of converting “the 
personal uneasiness of individuals…into involvement with public issues” (Mills, 1959: 12).  
 
My second text is a chapter by Carol Hanisch (1970) titled “The Personal is Political?”, a 
celebrated feminist work that appeared in an anthology Notes from the Second Year: Women’s 
Liberation. Hanisch’s focus is upon how, in her experience, members of the women’s movement 
address(ed) the realm of the “personal”. Hanisch agrees with Mills that fostering this imagination 
is necessary to disarm unreason and diminish unfreedom. But she argues that it is insufficient 
and is potentially counterproductive – an assessment that she illustrates by reference to the 
attitude of many movement members’ towards non-activists. Specifically, Hanisch takes issue 
with how non-activists are dismissively described, and effectively written-off, as “apolitical”. In 
the Dalai Lama’s (2011) terms, Hanisch considers this disrespectful attitude, which effectively 
dismisses non-activists as “cheerful robots”, to lack “wisdom and compassion” (Dalai Lama, 
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2011: 250); and she commends greater openness to, and curiosity about, Otherness, including the 
stance of non-activists. When the political quality of the Other’s consciousness is appreciated 
and examined, it can stimulate critical (self) reflection on movement members’ disinterest in, or 
dismissiveness of, non-activists. 
 
The Sociological Imagination and “The Personal is Political” are texts that address 
aspects of the post-War era. During this period, the conformity of the 1950s examined by Mills 
mutated, in the 1960s, into forms of rebellion that included the emergence of the women’s 
movement as well as an emergent interest in non-Western spiritual traditions. Despite the 
intervening decades, their themes and analyses have continuing relevance for progressive 
practices and movements. Amongst these, I include Critical Management Studies (CMS) in 
which I have had a close involvement (Willmott, XXXX), and also the Mindfulness movement 
that, for me, has resonances with a forty year commitment to a Tibetan Buddist (Kagyü) tradition 
of meditation practice. 
Mills’ The Sociological Imagination commends an emancipatory vision in which, to 
quote, “the end product of any liberating education is simply the self-educating, self-cultivating 
man and woman; in short, the free and rational individual” (Mills, 1959: 207). Despite some 
noxious traces of chauvinism and macho individualism, The Sociological Imagination 
commends processes of learning as a means of “self-cultivation” that can mobilize and expand 
reason and freedom. “The Personal is Political” also prizes “self-cultivation” but focuses more 
directly upon its lived practicalities.  
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The educative impulse evident in Mills’ and Hanisch’s texts is central to a third text,  
Freire’s “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” (1970/2005) on which I draw more selectively when 
unpacking the dynamics of unreason and unfreedom.  When read in conjunction with The 
Sociological Imagination and “The Personal is Political”, it can be seen that the leans more 
towards what Friere terms a “banking approach” approach to education, and to personal and 
social development, that conceives of learning primarily as a matter of acquiring a series of 
“deposits” that comprise each field of knowledge. People are conceived as vessels into which 
enlightening knowledge - such as the connectedness of “personal troubles” and “public issues” - 
is poured. When this approach is adopted, resistance to its application tends to be ascribed to 
deficiencies in its intended recipients  rather than to the inherent limitations and performativity of 
its passive and conception of human beings as “objects of assistance” (Freire, 2005: 83).  
 
In contrast, the pedagogy informing “The Personal is Political” more closely resembles 
Freire’s “problem-posing” approach which “affirms men and women as beings in the process of 
becoming – as unfinished, uncompleted beings in and with a likewise unfinished reality (sic)” 
(Freire, 2005: 85). This open, becoming condition applies no less to the educator than to the 
educated. Dialogical rather than didactic, “problem-posing” learning is embedded in experience: 
it enables people to “see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality in process, in 
transformation” (Freire, 2005: 84). In the context of Mindfulness practice, the “problem-posing” 
approach resonates with an orientation that, in the words of one practitioner, enables him/her   
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“to be respectful and compassionate, rather than pursuing my own agenda or being trapped in my 
ego needs” (Sinclair, 2015: 9).  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. I begin with a brief sketch of my understanding of 
meditation as this informs the reading of the contributions of Mills, Hanisch and Freire that 
follow. Since meditation forms the core of any coherent theory and practice of Mindfulness, its 
discussion serves to connect this chapter with other contributions to this volume. Reprising The 
Sociological Imagination and “The Personal and the Political”, I then consider their relevance 
for the development of progressive, emancipatory theory and practice in which I include the role 
of meditation in facilitating the dis-closure of a more awakened state of being wherein the 
destructive energies of “hatred, selfishness, jealous, and anger” are transmuted into those of 
“compassion and wisdom” (Dalai Lama, 2011: 250) . Finally, I expand briefly upon the idea that 
meditation offers a potent means of addressing the deficit in reason when attending to the 
problem of freedom.   
 
Meditation and Mindfulness: A Brief Overview 
 
My understanding of meditation, its relationship to mindfulness as a practice and to 
Mindfulness as a movement, is summarized as follows: 
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Moments of meditative awareness or mindfulness arise when there is a sense of 
oneness, of being in the here-and-now (e.g. “in flow’) that is experienced as a “calmness 
and presence of mind” (Dalai Lama, 2011: 250), or mindfulness, that is comparatively 
uncluttered by a preoccupation with securing a sense of separateness. This awake 
awareness may occur spontaneously at any time in any place. It is not confined to any 
specific time or place such as  ‘sitting’ or ‘walking’. Meditation practice may also be 
more concentrated where it is the equivalent of taking a language class, as contrasted 
with speaking the language. Meditation practice is concerned with dispelling the illusion 
of ego and discarding its armor in everyday life. Its effect is to debunk, reduce and 
ultimately eliminate sources of unnecessary suffering associated with pre-serving ego. 
The dispelling of ego occurs as the processual, impermanent nature of everything is 
disclosed, experientially as well as cognitively. Mindfulness as a movement tends to 
disembed meditation from spiritual traditions (e.g. by positioning it within a medical or 
mental health logic), and so it more readily endorses, or permits the adoption of, 
Mindfulness as a new ‘armour’ that, for example, fosters a sense of invincibility by 
“building resilience”, “boosting emotional intelligence” and “enhancing creativity” 
(Seppälä, 2015; see also et al. 2016) - all for the strengthening of ego rather than its 
debunking.   
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Schematically, meditation can take the meditator in three possible directions, all of which 
have political consequences for the reproduction or transformation of the self and social 
relations.  
 
First, meditation practice may do little to disclose and disrupt habitual patterns of being-
in-the-world: the meditator may fall asleep or becomes completely carried away by, rather than 
become more aware of, the normal stream of consciousness. By default, the ostensible normality 
of the status quo is undisturbed. The primary obstacle to meditative awareness is distracting - 
ego-threatening or alluring - thoughts or sensations. Unless this obstacle is recognized and 
removed, meditating makes little difference, except perhaps to provide a spiritual or “cool” 
badge of identity. 
 
Second, meditation practice may have the rather paradoxical and perverse effect of 
strengthening or inflating the ego and, in this respect, is continuous with therapeutic culture that 
is indebted to ego psychology (see Rakow, 2013). As it is possible for virtually anything, 
including spirituality, to become a vehicle of ego inflation, the illusion of separation and 
sovereignty may be magnified rather than diminished by meditation practice. Meditation-as-
Mindfulness may, for example, feed arrogance and self-deception by regarding it as a source of 
achievement - as exemplified by a sense of being “holier than thou”, or of being better equipped 
than others to manage stress or perform better in the workplace or elsewhere. This sense may be 
short-lived, or it may intensify feelings of inadequacy and insecurity, thereby undermining rather 
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than building “personal capital” and associated capacity (Grant, 2015). I associate this “dark” 
outcome with the direction of meditation practices, including forms of Mindfulness, that promise 
to increase the person’s capacities of adjustment, resulting in performance ‘improvements’ being 
celebrated as a personal achievement that must then be safeguarded and defended, rather than 
simply registering it as an unremarkable outcome of meditation.   
 
Just as forms of meditation embedded in spiritual traditions (e.g. Buddhism and 
Christianity) may be misapplied in ways that are “spiritually materialistic”, practices commended 
by Mindfulness may diminish, rather than strengthen, the illusion of separation and sovereignty 
that supports and sustains a sense of ego-hood. In Buddhist traditions, such as the Tibetan Kagyü  
school, the motivation for meditation practice is the development of compassion towards all 
beings that is most fully realized by undertaking practices whose outcome is enlightenment. 
Secular practices, including many forms of Mindfulness, lack this ethical underpinning and 
animation and instead favor secular “self-identified values or cross-culturally recognized virtues 
and character strengths” and they, it is argued, “have stronger theoretical and empirical 
foundations in psychological science” (Baer, 2015: 966). Nonetheless, secular meditation 
practices, such as those that are promoted or engaged as a means of increasing resilience to work 
pressures, may also have the (unintended) consequence of drawing its practitioners towards 
another state of being as they are  inadvertently take in a different, third direction. As Sinclair 
(2015: 6) notes: 
 
MADNESS AND MINDFULNESS: HOW THE “PERSONAL” IS “POLITICAL”           11 
 
 
“Although it is true that practicing mindfulness often helps people to cope with stress, to 
just treat it as a tool would be to miss many other profound opportunities that arise from being 
mindful. Rather than lashing ourselves to the mast of life, driving ourselves harder, mindfulness 
can open the door to being in the world and in our lives differently, without being hounded by 
the relentless drive to change ourselves and others”.  
 
The third direction of meditation practice is one of a greater openness [to the Other]: “a 
state of open expansive awareness, able to notice – and appreciate – more of what’s there” 
(Sinclair, 2011: 5). The meditator’s sense of separateness and sovereignty in relation to the Other 
– natural and social – is unsettled and dissolved rather than affirmed or strengthened. As the 
desire to defend ego weakens, the prospects for “figuring out” the Other, in Hanisch’s (1970) 
words, are improved, though never guaranteed. There is no certainty because an inclination, or 
impulse, to defend one’s sense of identity or selfhood – by disregarding or being dismissive of 
the Other, for example –is liable to reappear.   
 
Where “personal” transformation involves increased openness to the Other, and reduced 
defensiveneness in securing an established sense of self, it is progressively, if not intentionally, 
“political” in its expression and consequences. One significant outcome is the greater likelihood 
that the Other will be respected, listened to, and learned from. Increased openness fosters an 
agonistic and engaging orientation, as contrasted to one that is antagonistic and dismissive. 
Antagonistic relations to the Other tend to involve, but also obscure, a rather cowardly, defensive 
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stance. In order to avoid scrutiny by the Other, its proponents avoid meaningful, substantive 
engagement – for example, by invoking procedures.. An agonistic orientation, in contrast, 
requires courage as well as considerable patience to communicate more directly and respectfully 
with the Other (which is often, but not necessarily, reciprocated). 
 
Before moving on, it can be acknowledged that advocacy of meditation as a means of 
connecting the “personal” and the “political” may strike some readers as incongruous, if not 
ridiculous. That, I suspect, is because meditation tends to be associated, and conflated with 
inward-looking passivity that eschews “public” or “political” involvement. As noted earlier, 
meditation may be inconsequential when it has minimal effect on the practitioner or it may be 
hijacked by ego to develop a more comfortable, spiritually accomplished, sense of separation 
that changes little or nothing except the further solidification of the ego.  Meditation practices, 
including those associated with Mindfulness, may be seized upon as a means of escaping from, 
rather than attending to and examining, whatever is experienced by ego as threatening and/or 
painful:   
 
“We want to escape. We want to run away from pain rather than regard it as a source of 
inspiration. We feel the suffering to be bad enough, so why investigate it further? Some people 
who suffer a great deal and realize that they cannot escape their suffering really begin to 
understand it. But most people are too busy attempting to rid themselves of irritation…” 
(Trungpa, 1973: 162) 
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In meditation practice, as in everyday life, the three orientations outlined above may 
engage and circulate in the space of a few minutes or seconds. Distractedness and day-dreaming 
are commonplace, as is the desire to escape from vulnerabilities, become better adjusted, or 
elevate (one)self over the Other. Such desires, and associated enslavements to them, are media 
and outcomes of unfreedom and unreason. In the next section, I outline how, in The Sociological 
Imagination, Mills (1959) argues that the key to revealing and overcoming unreason and 
unfreedom resides in addressing and transforming the relationship between “ private troubles” 
(the personal) and “public issues” (the political).  
 
Only Connect…Private Troubles and Public Issues: The Sociological Imagination 
 
The Sociological Imagination is concerned with the dulling of reason and trivialization of 
freedom in post-War America. Published in 1959, it has over 13,000 citations on Google 
Scholar. What makes The Sociological Imagination a classic that continues to be referenced, 
including by students of organization and management, is its identification of a practical and 
theoretical disconnect between personal troubles and public issues. It continues to resonate in 
contemporary advanced capitalist societies where, to invoke another binary coined by Galbraith 
(1958) in the 1950s, private affluence (or greed) is accompanied by public squalor (or 
disadvantage). That said, The Sociological Imagination is not without flaws. For example, Mills 
MADNESS AND MINDFULNESS: HOW THE “PERSONAL” IS “POLITICAL”           14 
 
 
repeatedly uses of term ‘man’ and there is an associated absence of any reference to the 
‘problems’ and ‘issues’ later addressed by feminism. 
 
A key figure in The Sociological Imagination is the “Cheerful Robot” – a trope that 
identifies people who, in Mills’ imagination, become social robots radiating an air of 
contentment that veils their growing “alienation” (Mills, 1959: 190-1). As workers/ consumers/ 
citizens they compliantly execute instructions within modern, “rationally organized” institutions 
where they feel helplessly trapped, morally insensible and are increasingly incapable of taking 
responsibility for their actions. For Mills, “politics” and “the political” are not confined to 
government or electoral processes. “Politics” refers to all forms of power relationships, including 
those within workplaces. A society of ‘Cheerful Robots’ is, for Mills, “the antithesis of the free 
society – or in the literal and plain meaning of the word, of a democratic society” (ibid: 191). As 
he  writes:  
  “Nowadays men often feel that their private lives are a series of traps…Even when they 
do not panic, men often sense that older ways of feeling and thinking have collapsed and that 
newer beginnings are ambiguous to the point of moral crisis. Is it any wonder than ordinary men 
feel that they cannot cope with the larger worlds with which they are so suddenly confronted? 
That they cannot understand the meaning of their epoch for their own lives? That – in defense of 
selfhood – they become morally insensible, trying to remain altogether private men? Is it any 
wonder that they come to be possessed by a sense of the trap? (Mills, 1959: 9, 11, emphases 
added).  
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In the contemporary context, it is not difficult to appreciate the continuing relevance of 
Mills’ references to a sense of being “trapped” by larger forces – of nuclear annihilation, 
financialization, immigration, globalization. Indeed, the sense of “uneasiness and indifference” 
that he identifies as “the signal feature of our period” (Mills, 1959: 19) has, arguably, become 
amplified in the face of global warming and mass migration. Today, the indifference associated 
with feelings of “moral insensibility” and being “trapped” has morphed from the fanatical mass 
consumerism of the late twentieth into the unreason of moral sectarianism and populist 
fanaticism of the twenty-first century. Mills’ concerns about moral insensibility are echoed inter 
alia in warnings and appeals, including those that urge us to be “mindful of McMindfulness” 
(Purser and Forbes, 2017) because, in the contemporary corporation, yesterday’s “Robot” is 
invited to become a “Mindful Zombie” (Purser and Forbes, 2017; See also Goto-Jones, 2013). 
When the latter’s “personal troubles” (e.g. anxiety) are tackled (narcissistically), by encouraging 
an “obsessive self-monitoring of one’s inner state”, as a means of performance enhancement or 
productivity improvement, any “wider vision of the outer world” is displaced (Purser and Forbes, 
2017). More generally, Mills cautions that: 
“Rationally organized social arrangements are not necessarily a means of increased 
freedom…In fact, often they are a means of tyranny and manipulation, an expropriation of the 
very chance to reason, the very capacity to act as a free man” (Mills, 1959: 187)  
Today the impersonality and soullessness of the “rationally organized’ workplace is 
supplemented and renewed, but not replaced, by “post-rational” elements which extend the forms 
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of unreason and unfreedom. Novel elements extol strong culture, fun and/or freedom, including 
commercialized packages of Mindfulness adopted my major companies, including leading social 
media companies. By facilitating greater groundedness through relaxation and embodied 
awareness,  mindfulness initiatives may appear to mitigate, and perhaps reduce, the “traps” of 
rationalization (Mills, 1959: 9). To that extent, they seek to address “alienation” (Mills, 1959: 
190-1), taking the form of mental absenteeism and stress. However, when remedies for  
“alienated man” (Mills, 1959: 190) are geared to, and justified by, the quest for productivity 
improvement, they are an example of the “traps” to which Mills makes reference, not a release 
from them. They offer an ineffective, if not “futile, attempt to shield us from the various 
suffering and vulnerabilities of daily living” (Purser and Forbes, 2017). In the form of corporate 
Mindfulness programmes, they tend invite a slavish dedication to a “hyper vigilant” (Purser and 
Forbes, 2017), self-absorbed kind of mindfulness. Such Mindfulness may promise to harness the 
full range of employees’ productive capabilities, but it is deafeningly silent on the role of 
collective self-determination in addressing institutionalized alienation.  
In Mills’s terms, alienation and needless suffering is perpetuated when a “public issue”  - 
such as collective estrangement from the means of production where the creative powers of labor 
are commodified and disempowered - is framed as a “private trouble”, conceived as stress or 
psychological absenteeism. Far from being passé, Mills’ observation that “in the big-scale 
organization…[t]here is rationality without reason… Such rationality is not commensurate with 
freedom but the destroyer of it” (Mills, 1959: 189, emphasis added) has a contemporary 
resonance. This is especially so when “freedom” is conflated with forms of self-expression in the 
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workplace that are considered to contribute to productivity (e.g. by reducing stress-related 
absenteeism), and so counteracts any inclination to associate unfreedom with the operation of 
established structures of ownership and control in which employee well-being is equated with 
successful performance management. 
 
Diagnosing the Modern Malaise 
 
It is not hard to understand why, when finding that “they cannot cope with the larger 
worlds”, desperate people are drawn to “solutions” that rely upon unreason and perpetuate 
unfreedom, often in the name of freedom and rationality. These “solutions” frequently cast their 
adopters as beneficiaries of change frequently delivered by authoritarian, messianic demagogues 
for whom the domains of business, sport and management consultancy as well as religion and 
politics are alluring and rewarding. Masquerading as the champions of “the little guy” or the 
“downtrodden”, they emerge and thrive in circumstances where the capacity of people to 
organize collectively to make changes, rather than robotically lend their trust and support to 
ostensibly benevolent leaders, is underdeveloped or weakened.  
 
Unfreedom is, for Mills, symptomatic of societies where citizens are unable “to take into 
account how individuals, in the welter of their daily experience, often become falsely conscious 
of their social positions” (Mills, 1959: 11). The sociological imagination is conceived to enable 
its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life 
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and the external career of a variety of individuals” (Mills, 1559: 11). Sociological imagination is 
commended as a remedy for the malaise by providing the knowledge that connects  “private 
troubles” and “public issues”. The resulting knowledge “enables its possessor to understand the 
larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a 
variety of individuals” (Mills, 1959: 11). It thereby corrects the moral insensibility of the Robots, 
dissolves their false consciousness, and so facilitates their release from - or, better, the removal 
of - the “traps” (Mills, 1959: 9).  
 
Sixty years after its publication, many insights of The Sociological Imagination remain 
relevant. Yet, Mills offers little commentary - beyond an occasional, teasing reference to “the 
defense of selfhood” - on how to overcome resistance to the release of  consciousness from its 
“falsity”. What, it may be asked, can enable citizens to “possess”, as Mills puts it, “the quality of 
mind essential to grasp the interplay of man and society, of biology and history, of self and 
world” (Mills, 1959: 10, emphases added)?  
 
Despite his thesis that modern institutions foster “rationality without reason” and may 
become “a means of tyranny”, Mills places much faith in the power of reason, as exemplified by 
the demystifying capabilities ascribed to social scientists for whom “one of our intellectual tasks 
[is] to clarify the ideal of freedom and the ideal of reason” (Mills, 1959: 198). The example is 
given of teaching that helps students “to turn personal troubles and concerns into social issues 
and problems open to reason” (Mills, 1959: 206, emphasis added), thereby enabling students to 
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become “reasonable and free” (Mills, 1959: 206, emphasis added). The aim of the teacher, 
guided by sociological imagination, is commendable: “to combat all those forces which are 
destroying genuine publics…or put as a positive goal, his (sic) aim is to help build and to 
strengthen self-cultivating publics. Only then might society be reasonable and free” (Mills, 1959:  
206, emphasis added). I fully subscribe to the Enlightenment ambition of exercising the power of 
reason to debunk and remove unfreedoms (e.g. slavery and bigotry). Reason can play a key role 
in challenging knowledge claims and associated practices that institutionalize suffering, 
including structured social inequalities of class, gender, ethnicity, disability and so on (see 
Renault, 2010) . To this end, it is crucial to connect “’the personal troubles of milieu’ with ‘the 
public issues of social structure’” (Mills, 1959: 14) – such as connecting contemporary feelings 
of uneasiness with a reluctance to take political irresponsibility for how “rational organizations 
… systematically regulate [our] impulses and aspirations” (Mills, 1959: 189, citing Mannheim).  
 
The exercise of reason can disclose the structural conditions of actions, including “Robots’” 
“impulses and aspirations”. While necessary, this is, however,  an insufficient, basis for attaining 
“freedoms to” that include engagement in practices of (collective) self-determination. For,  
tellingly, when Mills commends the sociological imagination as an antidote to “false 
consciousness”, he has very little to say about the contents of such consciousness beyond its 
manifestation in the disconnection of “private troubles” from “public issues”. Mills is silent on 
how to address and overcome indifference or resistance to the acquisition of his favoured 
antidote. He simply repeats the “only connect” mantra and insists that “Above all, do not give up 
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your moral and political autonomy” (Mills, 1959: 248) that, on Mills’s own account, the 
“Robots” have either never developed or have largely discarded. Even if, contra Mills, the 
“Robots” retain a measure of autonomy, and have even imbibed some of elements of Mills’ 
sociological imagination, the courage and conviction to act with greater “political responsibility” 
(Mills, 2005: 195) may well be wanting. As we shall see, the obduracy of that deficit is an 
example of how, for Hanisch (1969), the personal is political.  What is “personal”, including our 
“private troubles” is not only disconnected from “public issues”, as Mills’ sociological 
imagination shows. Additionally, the contents of the “personal” are “political” as they impact 
upon the the latter’s reproduction or  transformation  It is why the injunction to become Mindful 
“just be mindful” as a means of addressing the “private trouble” of stress, for example, is a 
“commodification” and “instrumentalization” of mindfulness (Purser and Forbes, 2017). It is 
also why criticism of Mindfulness is politically and personally coherent, rather than misdirected 
or misconceived. The potency of the criticism resides in its dis-closure of how, when 
Mindfulness practice is privatized, its restrictive focus on continuous, obsessive, self-
surveillance acts to narrow, rather than expand, awareness. 
 
 
 
“The Personal is Political” 
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It would be presumptuous to claim that there is an easy or fully compelling way to act 
with greater “political responsibility” (Mills, 2005: 195) but “The Personal is Political” 
(Hanisch, 1969) offers some some valuable pointers. The phrase “the personal is political” is 
widely attributed to Hanisch but she credits it to her editor. I confess to a nostalgic interest in the 
1960s which, for me, was a formative period. I was considerably influenced by countercultural 
ideas, especially those that drew no firm line between political activism and personal 
experimentation in processes of challenging convention and seeking to change the world. 
 
For Hanisch, as for Mills, the challenge is to diagnose and repair the disconnect between 
“the personal” (private troubles) and “the political” (public issues). When reflecting upon her 
involvement in the women’s movement during the 1960s, she shows how, in everyday life, the 
“personal” and the “political” are practically fused, yet ideologically become disconnected. 
Hanisch illustrates this contradictory relation when she examines how members of the movement 
identified and dismissed non-activist women as “apolitical”:  
 
“What is happening now is that when non-movement women disagree with us, we 
assume that it is because they are “apolitical”, not because there might be something wrong with 
our thinking” (Hanisch, 2006). 
 
Hanisch’s reflections, I want to suggest, have broad applicability for facilitating processes 
of progressive change. Instead of dismissing the Other (e.g. non-activist women) Hanisch is 
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sufficiently curious to examine the contents of their ostensibly “apolitical” consciousness. 
“Apolitical” consciousness, she argues, is endemically political. Their disinterest in, or hostility 
towards, non-activist women is, Hanisch contends, the expression of a different politics. To 
characterize non-activists as “apolitical” is, from this perspective, politically illiterate. It is also 
self-deceptive and self-defeating in terms of expanding the women’s movement. That is because 
processes of normalization that construe such politicization as neutral or “apolitical” contribute 
to the systemic disadvantaging and oppression of many women. Hanisch insists that the growth 
and effectiveness of progressive movements and practices depends upon an awareness of what is 
“political” in the “personal”. This awareness, she argues, was undeveloped in the women’s 
movement of the 1960s where, notably, its members were disinclined to address their complicity 
in “othering” non-activists, thereby restricting the appeal, growth and influence of the 
movement. 
 
Expanding on this theme, Hanisch contends that “ there are things in the consciousness of 
“apolitical” women (I find them very political) that are as valid as any political consciousness 
we think we have.“ (Hanisch, 2006, emphasis added). I interpret this claim as an 
acknowledgement of how every “political” stance is partial; it is valid from its own limited 
standpoint; and it therefore merits both respectful attention and constructively critical 
examination. Practically, it means nurturing curiosity in respect of the position of the Other, 
rather than presuming to know the Other and/or engaging in their casual dismissal.  
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To recognize the consciousness of the Other as “valid” is not equivalent to saying that 
“anything goes”, with its implication that challenging any view is pointless or groundless. 
Instead, it is to argue that productive dialogue depends on striving to appreciate how the views of 
the Other are rendered valid for them,, and equally how my interpretation of those views is 
rendered valid for me. The sociological imagination can play a valuable role in this process, 
albeit one that is partial and contingent  in illuminating the sense of validity. Only by respectfully 
appreciating how the Other’s (political) consciousness is valid for them is it possible to begin a 
dialogue. Openness to the Other is also, I suggest, a precondition of democratic interaction and 
debate. A commitment to openness expresses how, in my endeavor to recognize the Other, I 
strive to resist any self-securing urge to reframe Otherness in terms of my Sameness (e.g. I am 
“political”, ergo the Other is “apolitical”). Recognising and then disarming the egotistical 
impulse to negate the Other, and thereby prioritize self-confirmation and self-elevation, is 
congruent with Hanisch’s willingness to learn from the Other (e.g. women hostile to the 
women’s movement), rather than labeling and dismissing the Other as beyond engagement.  
 
“The Personal is Political” is of direct relevance for addressing “the Mills question”: how 
to expand freedom by mobilizing reason.  Her analysis suggests that, politically-and-personally, 
a readiness, and especially a preparedness to pay respectful attention to, and thereby improve the 
prospects of a dialogue with the Other, is critical for effective politicization. How, then, might 
such “preparedness” be facilitated? Hanisch’s answer is that it requires a reduction of complicity 
in inhibiting and avoiding such engagement. Specifically, when recommending that “We should 
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figure out why many women don’t want to do action” (Hanisch, 2006, emphasis added), she 
reflects that:  
“Maybe there is something wrong with the action or something wrong with why we are 
doing the action or maybe the analysis of why the action is necessary is not clear enough in our 
minds.” (Hanisch, 2006, emphasis added)   
 
In Hanisch’s assessment, the liberating effects of the women’s movement will be limited, 
and will not develop into a genuinely radical mass movement, so long as its members deny, and 
do not work harder to overcome, the restrictions of their own consciousness – restrictions that 
might, invoking Mills (1959), be ascribed to the robot within. This way forward requires not only 
respectful curiosity, rather than know-all-ness, about the Other that is based upon humility 
concerning the adequacy of our understandings of self in relation to the Other. To the extent that 
participation in a movement is motivated and governed by a desire to differentiate and elevate 
the self (“liberated or enlightened woman”) over the Other (“apolitical” - ignorant? naïve? - 
women), the outcome is predictable. Involvement is impeded because, from the outset, the Other 
is presumed to be beyond engagement. Potential insights into the limitations of movement 
members’ activism and the opportunity to learn how activism might be more effective are then 
denied.  
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Only by paying closer, respectful attention to the Other is there a prospect of advancing 
sufficiently relevant and appealing ways of showing how “private troubles” are instructively 
illuminated and fruitfully addressed by appreciating and (re)framing them as “public issues”.  
 
The Robot Within 
 
Defenders of the women’s movement have, unsurprisingly, taken issue with Hanisch’s 
analysis. For her critics, “the personal is political” signifies an unwelcome preoccupation with 
the “personal” that is a distraction from, rather than a contribution to, the  “political” mission and 
impetus of the movement. Paying attention to “private” issues (e.g. the “subjectivity” of 
women’s movement members) is considered an individualizing or psychologizing diversion from 
actively tackling and changing their “political” conditions. Hanisch (2006) recalls that, in the 
1960s, Leftist radicals might “sometimes admit” that women were systematically oppressed, and 
would support demands for “equal pay for equal work, and some other “rights””. They would 
make a partial connection between “personal troubles” (e.g. women’s grievances about 
inequalities, especially those external to what is considered to belong to the private or personal 
sphere) and “public issues” (e.g. the necessity of campaigning for changes in legislation). Even 
so, “…they belittled us no end for trying to bring our so-called “personal problems” into the 
public arena—especially “all those body issues” like sex, appearance, and abortion. Our 
demands that men share the housework and childcare were likewise deemed a personal problem 
between a woman and her individual man…. What personal initiative would not solve, they said, 
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“the revolution” would take care of if we would just shut up and do our part” (Hanisch, 2006). 
More determined action, not introspection about “something wrong”, is commanded. As Hanisch 
observes, activists regarded her participation in “consciousness-raising groups to discuss their 
own oppression” as “’navel-gazing’ and ‘personal therapy’ – and certainly ‘not political’” 
(Hanisch, 2006). 
 
It can be readily conceded that “endless navel-gazing” ushers a retreat into subjectivism, 
and so is unlikely to advance the aims of a social movement. Social movements require activism; 
but their continuing existence and influence is conditional upon members’ capacity to attract and 
retain new members. Building this capacity requires a release from the confines of a self-
referential “circle of certainty” (Freire, 2005: 39)  in which, for example, it is presumed that 
causality (and blame) for “personal problems” is fully ascribed to “the system”. For Hanisch, this 
ascription is not just facile; it is counter-productive for the radical mission of disarming unreason 
and debunking unfreedom. She doubts that problems, such as childcare and housework, are 
simply “personal” and so are to be resolved by being more assertive or taking greater “personal 
initiative”. Receptiveness to the Other, Hanisch argues, requires critical reflection upon, and as 
transformation of, the consciousness of the members of the women’s movement; and she 
illustrates this by reference to her own experience: 
 
“As a movement woman, I’ve been pressured to be strong, selfless, other oriented, 
sacrificing, and in general pretty much in control of my own life. To admit to the problems in my 
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life is to be deemed weak. So I want to be a strong woman, in movement terms, and not admit I 
have any real problems that I can’t find a personal solution to (except those directly related to the 
capitalist system). It is at this point a political action to tell it like it is, to say what I really 
believe about my life instead of what I’ve always been told to say.” (Hanisch, 1970) 
 
Hanisch (1970) notes, or  confesses,  that being a “movement woman” came at a price: 
she felt pressured to present herself publicly as a persona – “strong, selfless, other oriented - that 
she did not recognize privately. Movement membership was, she claims, defined by an outward 
appearance of seeming to be “in control of my own life”.   There is more than an echo here of  
Mills’ conformist Robot – perhaps a less cheerful, gendered automaton, but no less willing to 
comply with an alienated condition (Mills, 1959: 189). The comparison also suggests an 
occlusion of reason by ‘rationality’: “The Personal is Political” demonstrates how the 
institutionalized disarming of reason to suppress the disclosure and analysis of “real”, 
experienced “problems” (e.g. insecurity and inadequacy) is not confined to “big-scale” 
organization.  
 
As Hanisch became aware of the oppressive subjection of her membership of the 
women’s movement, she developed the view that acting politically encompassed speaking out 
about “what I really believe about my life instead of what I’ve always been told to say” 
(Hanisch, 2006). She resisted pressures to manage the impression of being “strong” and shed the 
self-deception of being “in control”. To remain silent was, for Hanisch, to be complicit in the 
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movement’s oppression of its members and to weaken, rather than improve the prospect of 
attracting new members. Instead of continuing to collaborate in the fantasy of the movement – 
notably, that its members, herself included, were “strong, selfless…” etc.,  - Hanisch resolved to 
traverse this fantasy by speaking the truth, as she believed it to be. Hanisch’s openness 
debunked, and threatened to destroy, the superhuman (robotic) pretense of being capable of 
handling all problems except those ascribed to the workings of the capitalist system. However, I 
do take issue with Hanisch’s seemingly uncritical endorsement of the idea that it is only the 
“capitalist system” to which we ascribe limits or barriers to our capacity to find “personal 
solutions”. In everyday life, we routinely identify, scapegoat and blame many “Others” or 
“systems” to escape acknowledgment of the extent of our own involvement and complicity in the 
reproduction of what Mills (1959) terms “public issues”. 
 
 
 
Beyond Complicity 
 
Hanisch relates the inhibition of “telling it like it is” to the ideology of the movement. 
Members of the women’s movement were disinclined to acknowledge that they had any “real 
problems” that could not be solved by themselves “except those directly related to the capitalist 
system”. Likewise, Mills contends that at the root of the problem of “personal uneasiness” 
(Mills, 1959: 11) and feelings of “being trapped” (Mills, 1959: 9) is a cognitive deficit (Mills, 
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1959: 10). This framing is, I suggest, broadly echoed in the assessments of (women’s) movement 
members that characterize non-activists as “apolitical”. The implication is that they lack “the 
quality of mind that will help them to use information and to develop reason in order to achieve 
lucid summations of what is going on in the world and what may be happening within 
themselves” (Mills, 1959: 11). This “information” is what members of the women’s movement 
seek to provide, or bestow, and thereby enable their sisters to acquire or “develop reason” that 
will penetrate false consciousness and thereby disclose “what is going on in the world” and 
“within themselves”.  It is the limits of this “information”, and its capacity to connect with what 
is going on “within themselves”, that Hanisch seeks to expose and challenge.   
 
In endorsing Hanisch’s challenge to the capacity of the sociological imagination to 
debunk forms of unfreedom and unreason, I do not question its capacity to connect “self and 
world” (Mills, 1959:10) and to appreciate the social conditioning of ostensibly “private 
troubles”, including feelings of “personal uneasiness” (Mills, 1959: 11). In the absence of such 
critical reflection, there is a tendency is to individualize, psychologize and pathologize both 
“troubles” and “issues” (e.g. unemployment, war, divorce, to uses Mills’ examples),  perhaps “in 
a pathetic attempt to avoid the large issues and problems of modern society”  (Mills, 1959: 19). 
However, it is one thing to insist upon connecting ostensibly “private troubles” to historical 
conditions and “structural changes” (Mills, 1959: 17). It is quite another to conflate private 
troubles with public issues by, for example, dismissing the play of so-called “dark forces” (Mills, 
1959: 20 citing Ernest Jones), including fear and arrogance, in our everyday actions.  
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Following Hanisch, it is implausible to ascribe all “real problems”, for which a personal 
solution cannot be readily found, to the “system”. Such fantastical, wishful thinking and self-
deception misses the opportunity to recognize, examine, and learn from feelings of “uneasiness” 
– such as Hanisch’s uneasiness about the pressures of managing the impression of being strong 
and selfless in order to gain acceptance as a member of the women’s movement. Reflection on 
such feelings can yield insights into other possible sources of discomfort, and thereby undermine 
their unthinking reproduction and debilitating effects. In Hanisch’s case, she relates the denial of 
weaknesses amongst women’s movement members to an ignorant dismissal of non-activists as 
“apolitical”. She shows how, by attributing the difficulties of attracting non-activists solely to 
their resistance, members of the women’s movement avoided reflection on their own complicity 
in that resistance.  
 
By taking up Hanisch’s analysis of the women’s movement, the forces of unfreedom 
have been shown to be “personal” in ways that are only partially apprehended by Mills’ 
sociological imagination. While “personal troubles” are conditioned by “public issues”, they are 
irreducible to them. Some “personal” constraints on our capability to debunk and overcome 
unfreedom cannot plausibly be fully ascribed to their disconnection from “public issues”. This is 
significant since, as a consequence of being inadequately acknowledged and addressed, 
“personal” constraints, such as a fear of freedom, operate to preserve “political” limits on the 
removal of unfreedoms. When reason is mobilized to debunk unfreedoms, it routinely 
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encounters, but also reinforces, the barrier of unexamined sentiment– the grip of emotional 
traumas and investments, as manifest in the appeal of black-and-white thinking, sectarianism and 
fanaticism – that pre-serves unfreedom.  
 
It has been shown how this restriction upon the emancipatory power of reason addressed 
by Hanisch in “The Personal is Political” where she illustrates how women’s movement 
members “othering” of non-activists as “apolitical” contributed to the exclusion of meaningful 
dialogue with them (Hanisch, 1969). As Freire (2005: 39) notes,  the actions of a person who is 
closed to dialogue  “revolves about ‘his’ truth”, and so ‘he’ “feels threatened if that truth is 
questioned.” Release from the self-referential “circle of certainty” (Freire, 2005: 39), in which 
we are prisoners of an intense emotional investment in our truth, depends upon developing - or, 
better, freeing - a capacity to be “not afraid to confront, to listen, to see the world unveiled” 
(Freire, 2005: 40). In Hanisch’s case, this capacity was expanded through her participation in 
small, “consciousness-raising” groups where, she writes, her political consciousness was no 
longer (so) suppressed or restricted: 
 
“I went, and I continue to go to these meetings because I have gotten a political 
understanding which all my reading, all my “political discussions,” all my “political action,” all 
my four odd years in the movement never gave me.” (Hanisch, 1970) 
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Hanisch claims that the “political understanding” developed in the meetings was absent 
from her involvement in the women’s movement. She gradually came to better understand how 
“the personal is political” as her participation in the meetings yielded experientially meaningful 
insights into “the problems in my life” (Hanisch, 2006). This aweness was inaccessible to, or 
could not be acknowledged by, women’s movement members. Through her participation in 
consciousness-raising groups, the nature and significance of  “the political” became more 
immediate and meaningful, and so enabled more effective, existentially grounded and committed 
kinds of action.  
 
Towards Embodied Knowing 
 
We have seen how, in Hanisch’s assessment, an understanding of the Other is impeded 
and diminished by (ego-inflating) arrogance and (ego-threatening) fear.  Defensiveness based 
upon fear makes it difficult, and perhaps unthinkable, for movement members to consider that 
“there might be something wrong with our thinking” (and our action) (emphasis added). So, is 
meditative Mindfulness of any relevance for addressing this personal/political problem? I 
conjecture that it can be of value when its effect is to reduce resistance to reflection on the 
solidity of  selfhood, and so weakens the sense of egohood in which arrogance and fear, in 
relation to the Other, are rooted. By developing a more open orientation,  it becomes possible, in 
principle, to enter a dialogue with the Other, and thereby comprehend better why, in  respect of 
the women’s movement, for example, “many women don’t want to do action”. An open 
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orientation facilitates a (non-defensive) identification of shortcomings (“something wrong”) that 
may include a deficit of self-clarity for which possible remedies may be proposed.  
 
I am particularly interested in the status of Hanisch’s claim that, as a consequence of the 
“political understanding”, developed by participating in “consciousness-raising” meetings, she 
was able, or empowered, to “say what I really believe about my life”?  The first step was to 
disclose and acknowledge the feeling that there are “real problems” for which she lacked a 
“personal solution” – that is, a solution consistent with the presumption of being in (sovereign) 
“control of her life”.   The second was to disclose and address, though her involvement in 
“consciousness-raising groups”, the self-deception and oppression associated with the pretense 
of being a “strong” and “selfless” (sovereign) subject.  
 
It may immediately be asked: how is it possible to “say what [we] really believe”, as 
Hanisch puts it, when, in articulating our beliefs, we necessarily rely upon specific, partial, 
discourses? There is no escape from the limitations of language that necessarily conceals the 
Real in our attempts to communicate what we feel and/or believe. Indeed the Lacanian Real, 
points to the possibility of what cannot be symbolized and also to the prospect of liberation from 
the impulse to objectify / secure ourselves: 
‘…liberation from our struggle with lack is synonymous with becoming that which we 
fear most: dwelling in the Real of no-thingness, groundlessness, egolessness – that which can 
never be objectified or symbolized’ (Purser, 2011: 301) 
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Hanisch’s efforts to communicate and justify her theory and practice of radical change - 
including the value she places on “figuring out why many women don’t want to do actionand the 
benefits she ascribes to participating in “consciousness-raising groups” - are necessarily 
mediated by available forms of reasoning and communication.  We are all constrained as well as 
enabled by what Mills (1959: 188-9) terms “self-rationalization” that “comes systematically to 
regulate [our] impulses and aspirations, [our] manner of life and [our] ways of thought” 
(emphasis added). How we interpret and articulate our feelings - as “uneasiness”, say, rather than 
as “weakness”, “timidity” or “suspiciousness” -  expresses the priority given to particular beliefs 
and “ways of thought” that rationalize the felt relation of self-to-the-world. And, indeed, as Mills 
(1959: 18) notes, it is likely that “Much private uneasiness goes unformulated”, especially when 
it is normalized as a social and/or existential inevitability.    
For Hanisch, the process of recognizing, addressing and debunking the “self-
rationalization” that perpetuates unreason and unfreedom, such as that associated with her 
membership of the women’s movement, is facilitated by critical self-reflection of the kind 
engendered by the consciousness-raising groups in which she participated. To the extent that 
these groups incorporate self-transformative praxis, they include, but also go beyond, 
communication that is rational and analysis of “self-rationalization”. Developing and applying 
the capacity to reach out to non-activists, rather than dismissing them as “apolitical”, for 
example, is shown to require the exposure and enactment of a transformed, more open way of 
being. Examining and questioning the characterization of the consciousness of non-members of 
the women’s movement as “apolitical” was a first step in the process of reaching out to, and 
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engaging, non-activists,  rather than casually dismissing them as Other. In Hanisch’s assessment, 
such engagement involves a transformation of being, and not just the acquisition of a different 
kind of knowledge.     
 
As Freire (2005) has argued, there is a key difference between imparting and banking 
information – for example, about the connectedness of biography and history provided by the 
acquisition of a sociological imagination – and embodying knowledge based upon problem-
oriented praxis.  In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Friere (2005) contrasts two, idealized and 
opposing approaches to education that have general applicability to wider processes of 
socialization and human development: “ banking” and “problem posing”. The “banking” 
approach conceives of human beings as passive receptacles into which nuggets of abstract 
knowledge are deposited – such as knowledge that non-members of the women’s movement are 
“apolitical”. Repeatedly transmitted but rarely reflected upon, or put to the test, such knowledge 
is bestowed “by those who consider themselves knowledgeable [about] those they consider to 
know nothing” (Freire, 2005: 72). Assured of the truth of this knowledge, its possessors resist or 
suppress meaningful dialogue as, from their standpoint, there is nothing of value to be learned 
from it. The communication of knowledge as a series of deposits is, in effect, a “practice of 
domination” (Freire, 2005: 81) as the recipients of its truth are required to become defined and 
governed by its providers.   
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In the “problem-posing” approach, in contrast, human beings are conceived to be defined 
by their capacity to exercise and develop “their power to perceive critically the way they exist in 
the world” (Freire, 2005: 83). The ability to raise doubts is regarded as a condition of possibility 
of transforming the relation of self and world.  The “problem-posing” approach is distintuished 
by “a practice of freedom” (Freire, 2005: 81) that “stimulates reflection and action upon reality” 
(Freire, 2005: 84). It “affirms women and men as beings who transcend themselves” (Freire, 
2005: 84). The difference between a banking approach to processes of politicization and a 
problem-posing approach is articulated by Hanisch when she writes that  
 
“I am getting a gut understanding of everything as opposed to the esoteric, intellectual 
understandings and noblesse oblige feelings I had in “other people’s” struggles” (Hanisch, 1970, 
emphasis added). 
This “gut understanding”, which is associated with embodied knowing, is nurtured within 
social spaces, such “consciousness-raising groups, where it is possible to voice, whether 
inwardly or externally, what otherwise is repressed or silenced.  Spaces that facilitate the 
removal of confusion and dispelling of self-deception are commonly found in traditions where 
“the practice of freedom” (Freire, 2005: 81) is conceived as social and collective. As if speaking 
directly to members of the women’s  movement who regarded non-activists as “apolitical”, 
Freire (2005: 67) writes that the deployment of “’libertarian propaganda’” or the endeavor to 
“‘implant’…a belief in freedom” necessarily reproduces domination by contriving to undertake a 
“transformation for the oppressed rather than one with them” (Freire, 2005: 67). Freire’s 
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preferred alternative is a “relationship of dialogue” (Freire, 2005: 67). On this point, at least, 
there is a shared understanding between Freire and Hanisch, and Mills (1959: 206) for whom the 
aim of the social scientist “is to help build and to strengthen self-cultivating publics. Only then 
might society be reasonable and free.” (emphasis added).   
 
But how is such “self-cultivation” (Mills) within a “permanent relationship  of dialogue” 
(Freire), in which there is a willingness and a receptiveness to “say what I really believe about 
my life instead of what I’ve always been told to say” (Hanisch), to be accomplished? How might 
it be possible to counter or at least mitigate tendencies or impulses to privilege private or selfish 
considerations rather than “publics”; to engage in monologues rather than dialogue;  and to say 
what we believe others want to hear, to be countered or at least mitigated?   As Hanisch’s 
experience of participation in “consciousness-raising groups” attests,  “dialogue” can, 
potentially, be hugely supportive in counteracting such tendencies. But can it by itself release the 
power necessary to engage in acts of truth-telling and the formation of “self-cultivating publics” 
(Mills, 1959: 206)? For readers interested in this connection, Dyrberg (2014) provides a 
systematic exploration of the relation between a democratic ethos and institutions, and  “truth-
telling” (parrhesia), which involves communicating “freely and being up-front…in contrast to 
holding something back, being secretive, covert and manipulative” is explored by (Dyrberg, 
2014: 2). His analysis illuminates the connectedness of “private troubles” (the personal) with 
“public issues” (the political): it “connects personal and institutional aspects of politics” 
(Dyrberg, 2014: 2). 
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I am attracted to Hanisch’s conjecture that critical reflection upon our assumptions and 
actions can be valuable for breaking or suspending habitual patterns of thought. It may thereby 
open up other kinds of practices including .the “inaction” of the “apolitical” Other?  Such 
reflection, Hanisch contends, involves an appreciation of how the “personal” – for example, the 
antagonism or indifference of “apolitical” women to the women’s movement – is “political”. But 
the development of this appreciative orientation itself requires some openness. If the openness 
necessary for a dialogue is restricted or stumbling, how might its development – or, better, is dis-
closure - be enabled? To what extent can the willful application of reason lower or remove the 
(defensive, ego protecting) barriers to openness, and thereby reduce our complicity in forms of 
oppression?  
Enter Meditation 
 
At the point, or moment when “dialogue” or communication fails or breaks down, greater 
receptiveness to practices dedicated to exposing and minimizing unreason and unfreedom in the 
guise of confusion, insecurity and defensiveness, may increase. A possible, if unlikely, antidote 
to the normalizing power exercised by everyday guardians of unreason and unfreedom - perhaps 
because it is so widely assumed to be “apolitical” – is meditation. Meditation?  
 
The relevance of meditation for debunking and disarming unreason and unfreedom is 
certainly in doubt if it is narrowly defined cognitively or instrumentally as, for example: 
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“1  :  to engage in contemplation or reflection   
2  :  to engage in mental exercise (as concentration on one's breathing or repetition of a mantra) 
for the purpose of reaching a heightened level of spiritual awareness” 
(Merriam Webster, 2017) 
 
Its relevance is also questionable when meditation is defined as the practice of passive 
contemplation “focus[ing] one's mind for a period of time, in silence or with the aid of chanting, 
for religious or spiritual purposes or as a method of relaxation: 
(meditate on/upon) think deeply about (something): he went off to meditate on the new idea.” 
(Oxford Dictionary of English, 2017) 
 
According to the above definitions, meditation is, at best, very loosely coupled to praxis. 
It is seemingly confined to contemplation, reflection, spiritual awareness, relaxing and deep 
thinking. What is largely missing from these definitions is the transformative power of 
meditation and its relationship to enlightenment, not as the substitution of deposits of rational 
knowledge for the contents of religious mythology but as an embodied praxis.  In its 
transformative effects, meditation is no more “apolitical” than the consciousness of the non-
activist women” to whom Hanisch refers. As George Orwell persuasively maintained, “there is 
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no such thing as 'keeping out politics'” (Orwell, 1946). Meditation and Mindfulness are not 
exceptions.  
 
As understood here, meditating is about discerning and dissolving the delusions of 
egohood, experienced as arrogance and fear, that impede the openness required for 
communication and communion. Meditating may involve some contemplation, reflection, 
relaxation, deep thinking and increased spiritual awareness. These are not the ends of meditation 
although, in the form of spiritual materialism, they may become its goal. Since meditation does 
not engage, or favor, any particular political philosophy, it may be mistakenly regarded as 
“apolitical”. As praxis, meditation can facilitate a process of becoming progressively more aware 
of, and becoming less identified with, and oppressed by, restrictive and/or confused patterns of 
thought and behavior. As a “practice of freedom”, meditation is oriented to the disclosure and 
removal of confusion. It involves processes of divestment or purification, not acquisition. It is a 
practice of surrender, rather that a perfection of technique. It permits the discovery, rather than 
the development or achievement, of a greater “awakeness” that extends to a clearer, less 
confused, awareness of the “political”.  As Trungpa (1973, p.4) puts it: 
 
“If the process [of meditation] were otherwise, the awakened state of mind would be a 
product, dependent upon cause and effect and therefore liable to dissolution…In meditation 
practice, we clear away the confusion of ego in order to glimpse the awakened state” 
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A release from unreason and unfreedom is enabled through a process of removing, or 
dissolving, confusion and self-deception.  There is an opening up and letting go, rather than a 
building up, of defenses. Meditation can dis-close how, at the heart of our confused state, the 
existential denial of inseparability compels us to cling to, and defend, whatever is sensed to 
affirm our sense of separateness and solidity. This confusion and associated suffering is 
attributed to the credibility, necessity and importance ascribed to our sense of sovereignty. 
Meditation can facilitate a relinquishing of the perception, or delusion, that we are, and have, 
separate, solid selves that are permanent and continuous. It is a practice of acknowledging and 
then surrendering what, for example, “I’ve always been told to say.” (Hanisch, 1970).  
 
Meditation fosters a capacity to admit that, for example,  “I have real problems that I 
can’t find a personal solution to” (Hanisch, XXXX); and it offers a practice that addresses those 
problems. The key word is “I”. A “personal solution” to “real problems” is elusive. That is not 
only because, as Hanisch discovered, in the absence of a supportive group, it can be unbearably 
threatening to “tell it like it is”. A “personal solution” is also elusive because only a partial and 
temporary solution can be provided in the absence of diminishing the defenses of “I”. That said, 
as noted earlier, meditation practice may permit and enable, but it does not guarantee, an 
awareness of the connectiveness of “personal troubles” (e.g. suffering) with the “public issues” 
of an institutionalization of the preoccupation with preserving our sense of egohood. 
 
MADNESS AND MINDFULNESS: HOW THE “PERSONAL” IS “POLITICAL”           42 
 
 
Replacing defensiveness with openness is not adequately conceived as a “personal” 
matter or project; nor it is a “political” one. It is both.  It is “political” because, the effect of 
meditative Mindfulness is a withdrawal from ego-invested struggles that simultaneously brings 
about change in prevailing structures and relations of power.  Specifically, it undermines 
relations of domination and oppression whose reproduction depends upon complicity that is 
sustained inter alia by egoistic fear and arrogance. It is “personal” because the process of 
dissolving fear and arrogance enables an expansion of awareness and transformation of 
consciousness. The practice and application of meditation is a process of “transforming the 
material of mind from expressions of ego’s ambition into expressions of basic sanity” (Trungpa, 
1973: 11). And in this sense, meditative Mindfulness is nothing special; it is very ordinary, as 
natural as breathing. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For many people, Mindfulness and meditation are mysterious or taboo. Despite a growing 
interest in some of their forms, especially those that promise self-improvement or performance 
enhancement, experiential knowledge of meditation or even Mindfulness remains comparatively 
limited, fleeting and/or superficial. Given this state of comparative ignorance, it is prudent to 
treat claims about meditation, including the arguments made in this chapter, with some 
skepticism. Otherwise, there is the risk of engaging in unquestioning, robotic forms of 
meditation, Mindfulness, or “McMindfulness”. It is necessary, if more challenging, to strive to 
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be open(minded) to what is unfamiliar, even when it may seem improbably, counterintuitive or 
outlandish. 
 
Commending meditation as a potential facilitator of emancipatory struggle does, I 
acknowledge, strike an unfamiliar, and perhaps incongruous, note. It is a perplexing proposition, 
mainly because meditation is so strongly associated with inward, aesthetic retreat from the world 
or with becoming “blissed out”. In defense of my improbable proposition, I submit that it is 
consistent with the responsibility ascribed by Mills to social scientists: to “deliberately present 
controversial theories…and actively encourage controversy” (p. 211). Shaking up commonsense 
thinking is important, according to Mills, because  
 
“In the absence of political debate that is wide and open and informed, people can get in 
touch neither with the effective realities of their world nor with the realities of themselves.” 
(Mills, 1959:211, emphases added)  
For Mills, “political debate” is key to becoming more “open” not only in relation to the 
“realities of the world” but also to the “realities of [our]selves”. But Mills is uncharacteristically 
silent on the question of how to establish and nurture openness, except in urging us to acquire the 
knowledge generated by a sociological imagination. Based upon her experience of the women’s 
movement, Hanisch argues that becoming open requires more than textbook knowledge of how, 
for example, “private troubles” are connected to “public issues”. Additionally, it entails the 
nurturing of a capacity to examine how “private troubles” impede not only the identification, but 
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also the realization, of this connection.  Meditation, including meditative Mindfulness, can 
facilitate the process of “political debate” by enabling people to “get in touch” with the effective 
realities of their world [and] themselves (Mills, 1959 :211).  
 
Hanisch’s “The Personal is Political” indicates how the effectiveness of “open and 
informed” political debate and the advancement of progressive political movements depends 
upon nurturing a capacity to attend carefully to the Other; and that this attentiveness involves a 
process of dis-closure and self-transformation. She illustrates the process when connecting “the 
realities” of her “personal” experience of being silenced, as a member of the women’s 
movement, to the “dark forces” (Mills, 1959: 20 citing Ernest Jones) that suppressed her voice. 
When in the grip of these forces, movement members elevated and defended their identity as 
“strong” and” selfless” by positioning and dismissing non-activists as “apolitical”. Generating 
and disseminating this ‘knowledge’ of non-activist women as “apolitical” allowed movement 
members to avoid the challenging, ego-threatening task of reaching out to them.  Hanisch’s 
account of her own transformation exemplifies the burning out of received wisdoms, confusions 
and self-deceptions – a process that is at the heart of meditation practice. Insofar as they share a 
focus upon “clear[ing] away the confusion of ego” (Trungpa, 1973: 4), examples of meditation-
in-action, such as Hanisch’s involvement in conscisounsness-raising groups, are continuous with 
other (e.g. sitting) practices. In whatever guise it takes, meditation practice is distinguished by its 
substance in removing the confusions of ego, and not by its form. 
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The claim made, and question begged, by this chapter concerns how the practice of 
meditation may enable us to penetrate more deeply into the realities of world/self. It has been 
claimed that meditation practice contributes to the disarming unreason and expanding freedom. 
By reducing suffering associated with the needless harboring of confusion and self-deception, it 
may reverse “the ascendency” (p. 194) of the cheerful, or cheerless, Robot to which Mills’ 
sociological imagination aspires.  
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